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Abstract
By trading derivatives on the ￿nancial markets, a ￿rm can hedge
against the ￿uctuations of its internal funds, in order to better coordi-
nate investment and ￿nancing decisions. This work shows how optimal
investment, debt, and hedging strategy can be strongly dependent on
the mechanism linking the ￿rm￿s internal funds to its returns on in-
vestment. In particular, when internal funds react to a prospective
price change (neutral shock), investment and debt would be positively
related; when internal funds react to a non neutral productivity shock,
investment and debt would be either negatively related (no hedging)
or unrelated (hedging).
JEL classi￿cation: G19; G31; G32. Keywords: Hedging; Invest-
ment; Debt; Volatility; Productivity.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
The technological change can be considered as the main engine of the recent
process of transformation of the economic landscape. According to Goldman
Sach estimations, in the ￿ve years between 1995 and 2000 the investment in
information technology in USA has increased by an annual average of around
25% in real term. It is commonly known that the information technology
has a shorter life than the more traditional capital equipments, such as
buildings or industrial machinery. Because of its higher rate of depreciation,
the ￿xed capital in the modern sectors has to be considered as more easily
reversible and more volatile than the traditional sectors￿ ￿xed capital. Not
only the investment is volatile: in a period of radical restructuring of the
production technologies and the ￿nal products oﬀered, also the ￿nancial
investors￿ con￿dence in their knowledge about the real value of the ￿rm is
likely to be rather more unstable than in periods of ordinary business. As
a result, corporations investing in new sectors may face greater uncertainty
about the internal funds available to the investment, as well as about the
outcome of the investment.
Firms carrying on investments with highly uncertain outcome are likely
to face also high borrowing costs for the following reasons: ￿rst, the lenders
ask for a higher risk premium in order to ￿nance riskier activities; second,
the assets of the high tech ￿rms are highly intangible and cannot be used as
reliable collateral; third, the equities are comparably much cheaper sources
of ￿nance, especially in a period of high enthusiasm for the ￿new economy￿
shares; fourth, as the main source of ￿nance is the stock market, the wealth
of the ￿rm is likely to be almost as volatile as its share price and the prob-
ability of default in case of a share price￿s fall can be particularly high. The
literature on corporate ￿nance has found several rationales for the external
￿nance (i.e. new equities or new debt) to be costly. Jensen and Meckling
(1976) argue that the external ￿nance is costly as the investors cannot con-
trol the actions of the managers unless paying agency costs. Mayers and
Majful (1984) show that raising new equities can be costly as the asymmet-
ric information between the insiders and outsiders leads to underestimate
the value of the better quality ￿rms. Despite the banks, according to Di-
2amond (1984), act as corporate monitors to mitigate the agency costs, the
informational asymmetries between lenders and the borrowers may cause
credit rationing, as Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) show. In general, it can be
argued that ￿rms give priority to the internal ￿nance or cash ￿ow to ￿nance
their projects of investment. The more a ￿rm is ￿nancially constrained,
the more its investment choices will be aﬀected by the availability of the
internal ￿nance. Jensen (1986) suggests that the investment choice of the
￿rm can be strongly dependent on the cash ￿ow available to the managers.
The eﬀects of the ￿nancial constraints on the investment choices of the ￿rms
are investigated in a number of works, for example Fazzari, Hubbard, and
Petersen (1988), Greenwald and Stiglitz (1993), Gertler (1988).1
However, an economic environment characterised by technological inno-
vations, investment reversibility, and volatile share prices would suggests
that not only the pure availability, but also the volatility of the internal
sources of ￿nance may aﬀect the investment choice and the capital struc-
ture of the ￿rms. The issues related to the volatility are investigated, within
the corporate ￿nance theory, by a relatively small number of contributions
that deal with risk management. The risk management, i.e. trading deriva-
tives on the ￿nancial markets, can be a useful tool available to any ￿rm
wishing to modify its own exposure to some hedgeable risk, for example,
market value, currency, interest rate, commodity price risks. Diﬀerent the-
oretical models on risk management share the common consideration that
hedging can aﬀect the payoﬀ of a risk-neutral ￿rm as long as some mar-
ket imperfections make the ￿rm￿s payoﬀ a concave function of some state
contingent variable. The rationales for the concavity of the payoﬀ func-
tion can be related to the ￿rm￿s tax schedule (Smith et al., 1985), to the
costs of ￿nancial distress (Smith et al., 1985; Shapiro et al., 1998), to agency
costs (Stulz, 1990), to asymmetric information problems (Rebello, 1995; De-
Marzo et al., 1995), to costly external ￿nance (Froot et al., 1993), or to a
c o m b i n a t i o no fs o m eo ft h e s ef a c t o r s( L e l a n d ,1998). Most of the models on
corporate hedging, however, do not derive the investment decisions of the
￿rms, as they assume given investment and focus, instead, on the choices of
1See Schiantarelli (1996) for a short survey, where some methodological issues and
empirical evidence are also discussed.
3the optimal capital structure. A valuable exception is the contribution of
Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein (1993), where investment and external ￿nance
decisions are endogenously determined. Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein (1993)
build up their model on the assumption that the returns on investment are
partially related to the internal funds available. More exactly, they assume
that a change of the internal funds is linked to a neutral (i.e. multiplicative)
shock to the investment function. However, the neutral shock can be identi-
￿ed as a simple price change (or investment opportunity) eﬀect, whereas in
a context of technical change, the shock to the investment function is likely
to be non neutral.
The present work centers around the comparison between a neutral ￿in-
vestment opportunity￿ shock and a non neutral ￿technical change￿ shock. The
main questions is: How these diﬀerent types of shock can aﬀect hedging, in-
vestment and debt decisions of the ￿rm? By working out the framework by
Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein (1993) of hedging with costly external ￿nance,
two possible mechanisms linking the returns to investment to the shock to
the internal ￿nance are modelled and compared. In the ￿rst one (here called
Investment Opportunity, IO), the shocks to cash ￿ow are assumed to be re-
lated to multiplicative shocks to the investment function, such as shocks
to the price of the ￿nal product. In the second one (here called Technical
Change, TC), the shocks to cash ￿o wa r ea s s u m e dt ob el i n k e dt on o nn e u -
tral shocks to investment technology. The general solutions, expressed in
non closed-form, do not allow for clear understanding about the determi-
nants and the properties of hedging decision and the eﬀect of hedging on
investment and debt choices. To overcome this limit, the two models, IO
and TC, are compared in the light of their empirical implications by using
approximated analytical solutions.
The two mechanisms are presented, ￿rst, in the general formulation end-
ing up with non closed-form solutions (section 2), then in the approximated
formulation, where analytical solutions for hedging, investment and debt are
derived (section 3). Subsequently, the two mechanisms are compared, ￿rst,
by demonstrating the properties of the optimal hedging strategies (section
4), then, by studying the eﬀects of hedging on the investment and debt
decisions (section 5), ￿nally, by simulating how diﬀerently ￿nancing and in-
4vesting behaviour react to the same productivity shock (section 6). Section
7 concludes.
2 The two models of hedging behaviour
This section works out the framework of Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein (1993)
and presents two models, Investment Opportunity (IO) and Technical Change
(TC), each one describing the behaviour of a ￿rm that chooses its risk man-
agement program in order to better coordinate its investing and ￿nancing
policies. The ￿rm operates in a context where its returns on investment are
partially related to the ￿uctuations of the sources of its internal ￿nance and
the external ￿nance is increasingly costly. By trading forward and future
contracts in the derivative market, the ￿rm can avoid unnecessary ￿uctua-
tions of the value of its existing assets. Both models show how the ￿rm can
calculate the optimal width of ￿uctuations and select accordingly its optimal
hedging ratio. The two models are similar in everything but the mechanism
linking cash ￿ow ￿uctuations to the uncertain returns to investment.
2.1 The setup
A risk-neutral ￿rm faces costly debt and uncertain returns to investment
and solves two decisional problems: (i) a simultaneous choice about how
much to invest and how much debt to raise, (ii) a choice of how much to
hedge against its internal funds ￿uctuations. The time structure of both the
models is the following (see also Table 1): at time 0, when both returns to
investment and internal funds available are uncertain, it chooses its hedging
strategy. At time 1, when the variable to be hedged is realised, it chooses
the amount of investment and debt. At time 2, the production is realised
a n ds o l da n dt h ed e b ti sr e p a i d .
5Table 1 - Time structure
time 0 time 1 time 2
Hedging strategy h∗






The analytical structure of the ￿rm￿s maximisation problem is built up
on the following set of assumptions. Where it is not speci￿ed, the assump-
t i o n sa r ec o m m o nt ob o t hI Oa n dT Cm o d e l s .
Marginal costs of debt:
The marginal cost of debt for both IO and TC mechanisms is an in-
creasing function of the amount. It is modelled as a generic function C(D),
where D is the amount of debt, C0(D)=CD > 0 and C00(D)=CDD > 0.
T h ec o s to fd e b t ,a sF S Sp o i n to u t ,c a na r i s ef r o md i ﬀerent sources, such as
cost of bankruptcy and ￿nancial distress, informational asymmetry between
lenders and borrowers, private bene￿ts to the managers from limiting their
dependence on external investors. Other sources of external ￿nance are not
considered. 2
Random value of the internal funds
As the debt is increasingly costly, the ￿rm prefers to raise the level of
the debt only when it cannot provide enough internal funds to its project
of investment. Its budget constraint at time 1 is given by I = V + D,
where V is the value of the internal funds available at time 1. Without any
hedging policy, the value of the internal funds is given by V = V0ε, where V0
is the initial value of the assets and ε is a hedgeable source of uncertainty,
2More exactly, Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein (1993) assume costly external ￿nance,
which includes also new equities (p.1633-4). Even though such more general assumption
would not change the structure and the results of this work, in this paper the emphasis is
on the debt as a more important source of external ￿nance than new equity issues. This
simpli￿cation is also carried on in the work of Whited (1992), on the ground of several
empirical contributions showing that ￿share issues typically account for less than 5% of
total new external ￿nance￿ (p.1426). It can be also justi￿ed by an assumption of equity
rationing, such as in Greenwald and Stiglitz (1993).
6distributed as a Normal with mean 1 and variance σ2. The budget constraint
of a non-hedging ￿rm would be given by
I = D + V0ε.( 1)
By trading derivatives at time 0, the ￿rm can modify the distribution of
its cash ￿ow across possible values of the shock ε. The choice to hedge is
modeled under the following simplifying assumptions: (i) the ￿uctuations of
the cash ￿ow, V , are completely hedgeable; (ii) hedging does not alter the
expected value of the cash ￿ow; (iii) hedging is linear, i.e. the sensitivity
of the cash to the changes of the random variable is constant. The latter
assumption concretely means that the usage of derivative described in this
model is limited only to forward and future contracts, therefore options
contracts are ruled out. The internal funds after hedging are given by V =
V0[h +( 1− h)ε], and the budget constraint becomes
I = D + V0[h +( 1− h)ε],( 2 )
w h e r et h ev a l u eo fh is determined at time 0, as a solution of the max-
imisation problem. In the special case of full hedging, where h =1 ,t h e
distribution collapses to the mean, and the value of the existing assets be-
comes non-stochastic: V = V0.
Returns on investment:
The two models, IO and TC, are diﬀerent for the assumption about the
shock to the investment function. In both models the marginal returns to
investment are decreasing.
￿ IO investment function. The net present value of investment ex-
penditures is given by
F(I)=θf(I) − I,( 3 )
where I is the investment, f(I) is the expected revenue of the output,
with f0(I)=fI > 0 and f00(I)=fII < 0. θ is a multiplicative shock
to the expected outcome of the investment decision.
7￿ TC investment function. The net present value of investment ex-
penditures is given by
F(I,θ)=f(I,θ) − I,( 4 )
where, as before, fI > 0 and fII < 0. The shock to the investment
function, θ, which is no longer multiplicative, represents a change of
the investment technology.
The shock to the investment function, θ, is neutral for the IO model, non-
neutral for the TC one. To simplify the interpretation, one can think that the
IO company is hit by a shock to the price of its ￿nal product, whereas the TC
company is hit by a shock to its investment function elasticity. Therefore,
the variable θ incorporates the randomness of the investment opportunities
in the ￿rst model (IO) and the randomness of the production technology in
the second one (TC).
Link between returns on investment and internal funds.
The shock θ is related to the internal funds according to a parameter α.
￿ IO shocks relation. The neutral shock to the investment function,
θ,i sg i v e nb y
θ = α(ε − 1) + 1.( 5 )
￿ TC shocks relation. The non-neutral shock to the investment func-
tion, θ,i sg i v e nb y
θ = α(ε − 1) + β.( 6 )
To illustrate the two diﬀerent shocks, it can be thought about the links,
through market expectations, between the ￿rm￿s investment decisions and
its market value. The IO company, producing information technology, will
￿nd that the market price of its product (say, a software) increases together
with its market value on the stock market. The TC company deciding to
introduce some new information technology into its old production process
will ￿nd, instead, that its market value increases together with the expected
pro￿t from the new technology expenditure.
8In the IO model, θ represents either a change in the price of the ￿nal
product or a neutral technical change, hence its expected level is equal to
1 by construction. In the TC model, θ represents, instead, a non neutral
shock to the investment function, hence, its expected value is equal to some
expected parameter of the investment function. For example, if θ is the
elasticity of the investment function, its expected value, β,w i l lb ee q u a lt o
the expected value of the elasticity.
2.2 The optimal hedging strategies
The pro￿t function is given by the diﬀerence between net revenues on in-
vestment expenditures and the full repayment of debt: π = F(I) − C(D).
Such function takes the following forms, respectively, for the IO and the TC
models:
IO pro￿t: π = θf(I) − I − C(D),( 7 )
TC pro￿t: π = f(I,θ) − I − C(D).( 8 )
The ￿rm maximises the pro￿t function with respect to the investment at
time 1,w h e na l lε, θ and V a r er e a l i s e d .T h ed i s c o u n tr a t ei sa s s u m e de q u a l
to zero for simplicity. The ￿rst order conditions of time 1￿s maximisation
problem are then given by
IO f.o.c.: θfI =1+CD (9)
for the IO model, and
TC f.o.c.: fI =1+CD (10)
for the TC model, where fI in 10 is a function of both I and θ.3
Moving back to period 0, when the internal funds are still uncertain, the




3For both models, at time 1 V is given, hence dD
dI =1 .
9The general solutions to the problem 11 are diﬀerent for the two models: for































T h ed e r i v a t i o no fb o t hf o r m u l a si si nt h eA p p e n d i x .
In general, it can be observed that both optimal hedging strategies de-
pend on the parameter α, expressing the relation between returns to invest-
ment and internal funds. In equation 12, a decreasing eﬀect of α on the
optimal hedging ratio is clearly visible, whereas in equation 13, such eﬀect
passes through the expression
∂fI
∂ε , where α is contained.4
A ￿rst empirical implication of both IO and TC mechanisms is that the
best strategy is to fully hedge (h =1 ) when there is no relation between
returns on investment and internal funds ￿uctuations (α =0 ). In fact,
there is no reason to let the ￿rm￿s cash ￿ow ￿uctuate if such ￿uctuations
are independent from the ￿rm￿s extra ￿nance requirements.
From the hedging strategies expressed in general forms, as in 12a n d13,
little more can be said about the determinants of hedging and the eﬀect of
hedging on investment and debt decisions, as well as about the diﬀerence
and the empirical implications of both mechanisms, IO and TC, the reason
being that expressions 12a n d13 are non closed-form solutions.5 In the
following sections, the diﬀerent implications of both mechanisms are better
investigated by comparing the analytical approximation of their solutions.
4In other words, the link between optimal hedging and the parameter α depends, in
both solutions, on the sensitivity of the marginal return to investment to a change in the
variable to be hedged. However, while in the IO model such sensitivity is constant and
simpli￿es to αfI,i nt h eT Cm o d e l
∂fI
∂ε is not necessarily constant. See Appendix for
technical details.
5The ratio between expected values on the rhs of both expressions includes, ￿rstly, the
levels of the investment and the debt, both depending on ε and h
∗, secondly, a direct
eﬀect of ε on h
∗ through the shock to the investment function, θ.
103 The approximation
This section derives the approximated analytical solutions for optimal hedg-
ing strategies, investment and debt functions of both IO and TC mecha-
nisms.6 The results are commented in the subsequent sections.
The approximation method consists in carrying on a second order Taylor
expansion of the investment and cost functions, respectively, around the
expected levels of the investment, I0,a n dt h ed e b t ,D0. The approximated
expected revenue and cost functions de￿ned above, i.e. f(I) and C(D), take




I2 + bI + k,( 14)
with a = fII(I0) < 0, b = fI(I0) − I0fII(I0) > 0 and k = f(I0) − I0fI(I0)+
1
2I2




D2 + rD + z,( 15)
with c = CDD(D0) > 0, r = CD(D0) − D0CDD(D0) > 0 and z = C(D0) −
D0CD(D0)+1
2D2
0CDD(D0),w h e r eCD = r + cD and CDD = c. This ap-
proximation simpli￿es the analysis of equations 12a n d13, as the second
derivatives of both approximated functions, 14a n d15 are constant.
The multiplicative shock for the IO model is still given by expression 5,
i.e. a neutral hit to the investment function related to a change of the inter-
nal funds available. The non neutral shock of the TC model has to be better
speci￿ed. To simplify the analysis, let￿s assume that the shock to the invest-
ment function related to the internal funds is a hit to the marginal product
of the investment function that leaves unchanged its concavity calculated at
I0. Therefore, starting from the second order Taylor approximation of the
investment function, 14, the shock to the elasticity is de￿ned as a shock to
the parameter b:
6The three unknowns are h, I, D for both the IO and TC mechanisms; the systems of
equations to be solved are 2, 9 and 12, for IO, and 2, 10a n d13f o rT C .
11b = α(ε − 1) + ￿,( 16)
where ￿ is the expected level of b.
3.1 The IO solution
After substituting for the approximated functions 14a n d15, the ￿rst order
c o n d i t i o no ft i m e1 maximisation problem for the IO model is now given by
θ(aI + b)=1+r + cD,( 17)
where θ is given with certainty at time 1,t o g e t h e rw i t hε.
Investment and debt functions of a non hedging ￿rm are derived by com-
bining the ￿rst order condition 17 with the non hedger￿s budget constraint,
1:
I∗(ε)=




θb − (1 + r)+θaV0ε
c − θa
,( 19)
where θ is given by 5.
By using, instead, the hedger￿s budget constraint, 2, the investment and
the debt functions of the hedging ￿rm turn out to be the following:
IIO
h (ε)=





(hIO − 1), (20)
DIO
h (ε)=





(hIO − 1),( 2 1)
The optimal hedging strategy is derived from a second order Taylor
expansion of the two expected terms around ε =1of equation 12, after
12substituting for the approximated functions￿ derivatives, fI, fII,a n dCDD,





1+r − cV0 − bc
a
¢¡
(a − c)2 +3 a2α2σ2¢
(a − c)((a − c)2 +3 acα2σ2)
. (22)
Finally, equation 22 can be substituted into equations 20 an 21 to ￿nd
the explicit solutions for the investment and the debt levels.
In both cases of hedging and no hedging, the investment and debt choices
depend on the realisation of ε at time 1. However, for the hedger they depend
also on the optimal hedging strategy h∗, which can regulate the eﬀects of
the random variable￿s ￿uctuations according to the ￿rm￿s own necessities.
3.2 The TC solution
After substituting approximated functions 14a n d15, the ￿rst order condi-
tion of time 1 maximisation problem for the TC model becomes
aI + b(ε)=1+r + cD, (23)
where b i sg i v e nw i t hc e r t a i n t ya tt i m e1,t o g e t h e rw i t hε.
Given expression 16 for the technical change, the sensitivity of the marginal
return to investment to a change in the variable to be hedged,
∂fI
∂ε (which is




Substituting in 13 for the approximated functions￿ derivatives, fI, fII,
and CDD,a n df o r
∂fI





all the terms included in equation 13 ￿ se x p e c t e dv a l u e sb e i n gc o n s t a n t .
Solving the system of two equations 23 and 1 gives the optimal levels of
i n v e s t m e n ta n dd e b to ft h e￿rm that does not hedge against the ￿uctuations









[α(ε − 1) + ￿ − (1 + r)+aV0ε]. (27)
Solving the system of three equations 23, 2 and 25 gives the optimal






(ε − 1) +
1
c − a






[￿ − (1 + r)+aV0]. (29)
4 Properties of hedging
This section derives the implications of the approximated analytical solu-
tions for the optimal hedging strategies of both IO and TC models.
A ￿rst result, which is not visible in the implicit solutions 12a n d13, is
that the optimal hedging ratio is not aﬀected by the level of the variable to
be hedged. This is consistent with the setup of the model, as the level of ε,
by assumption, is only known at time 1, when the hedging decision is taken.
In particular, from the two approximated analytical solutions the following
propositions can be derived:
Proposition 1 When internal funds are linked to a prospective price change
(IO), the optimal hedging ratio, hIO, is a function of the volatility of the
shock to the internal funds, σ2. The level of the shock, ε, does not have any
eﬀect on the optimal hedging strategy.
Proposition 1 does not need proof, as it states what is visible from the
explicit solution for IO hedging (22). Therefore, the analytical solution
for the IO model allows one to substitute a virtually measurable variable,
14the standard deviation of the marketable shock, σ, to the unobservable
expectation in the implicit formula for hedging (12). In the TC solution, on
the other hand, the variance does not play any role:
Proposition 2 When internal funds are linked to a productivity shock that
does not aﬀect the concavity of the investment function (TC), then the vari-
ance of the variable to be hedged does not aﬀect the optimal hedging strategy.
Also Proposition 2 does not need proof as it states what is visible from
the explicit solution for TC hedging (25): the variance of the internal funds
￿uctuations in the TC model does not aﬀect the hedging decision, which is
aﬀected only by the relation between internal funds and productivity shock,
α, by the current cash ￿ow of the ￿rm, V0, and by the concavity of the
investment function, a.
The relationship between optimal hedging ratios and the parameter link-
ing returns to investment and internal funds, α, is demonstrated by the fol-
lowing proposition and shown in Figure 1 for both the IO and TC solutions.
Proposition 3 When internal funds are linked to a prospective price change
(IO), the greater is the relation between internal funds and returns to invest-
ment, α, the lower is the hedging ratio, h, for any σ2 lower than the critical
value σ∗2 =
−(a−c)2
3α2ac . When internal funds are linked to a productivity shock
that does not aﬀect the concavity of the investment function (TC), this de-
creasing relation is linear.
Proof of Proposition 3 is provided in the Appendix.
Figure 1 illustrates the shapes of the two hedging strategy as functions
of the correlation parameter α.7
7The parameterisation of Figure 1 is the same as described in section 6.
15Figure 1
If α =0 , the best strategy for the ￿rm is to fully hedge (h∗ =1 )a g a i n s t
the ￿uctuations of its cash ￿ow, as they are unrelated to the investment op-
portunities. If α > 0, such correlation is positive, and the ￿rm can take ad-
vantage of a positive ￿uctuation in its cash ￿ow to provide an extra amount
of funds to a planned extra amount of investment. The optimal strategy,
in this case, is a hedge ratio lower than 1,i . e .t h e￿rm hedges in order to
reduce the volatility of the internal cash ￿ow without completely eliminating
it. The higher is α, the lower is the hedge ratio, which is equal to zero when
the ￿rm does not hedge at all and lets its internal funds ￿uctuate according
to the primary market movements. If α is high enough, the best strategy
can be the speculative one (h∗ < 0), which ampli￿es the ￿uctuations of the
cash ￿ow and increases the ￿rm￿s exposure to the risk. Finally, if α < 0,
the relation between internal funds and returns on investment is negative,
therefore the best strategy is overhedging, in order to raise cash when ε is
low. Comparing the two hedging functions, hIO (continuous line) and hTC
(dotted line), it can be observed that the sensitivity of the hedging ratio to
the value of α is greater for the former than for the latter: greater relations
between returns on investment and internal funds is needed in the TC model
to move away from the full hedging ratio. The upper limit to the internal
16funds volatility for the IO model (σ∗2), for a hedging strategy to be feasible,
depends on the concavity of the pro￿t function, expressed by the parameters
a and c, and on the absolute value of the relation parameter α.
5E ﬀects of hedging on debt and investment
This section derives the implications of the approximated analytical solu-
tions for the optimal investment and debt.
Proposition 4 If investment opportunity is related to the internal funds
￿uctuations (IO model), and if the marginal return on investment is more
sensitive to the level of the investment than the marginal cost of debt to the
level of the debt (c<−a), then the eﬀect of the optimal hedging strategy is
to stabilize more the debt than the investment.
Proof of Proposition 4 is provided in the Appendix.
Proposition 4 states that in the IO model, under the condition that the
second derivative of the investment function (−a = fII) is greater than the
second derivative of the debt function (c = CDD), the debt functions after
hedging are much ￿atter than the investment functions after hedging. In
other words, provided that the revenue of an extra unit of investment is
more sensitive to a shock than the cost of an extra unit of debt, the nega-
tive events are weighted by the ￿rm more than the positive ones, therefore,
the ￿rm prefers, when it is possible, to slightly sacri￿ce the probability of
higher investment in order to drastically decrease the probability of a higher
debt. The ￿uctuations of the debt function, however, are not fully elim-
inable (the ￿rst term on the RHS of the debt function, 21,s t i l l￿uctuates
with θ independently from the value of hIO).
In the TC model, conversely, hedging even partially has the eﬀect of fully
eliminate the ￿uctuations of the debt.
Proposition 5 When internal funds are linked to a productivity shock that
does not aﬀect the concavity of the investment function (TC), then the eﬀect
of the optimal hedging strategy is to fully stabilize the level of the debt.
17Proof of proposition 5 is provided in the Appendix.
I n v e s t m e n ta n dd e b t ,w i t h o u th e d g i n g ,d e p e n do nt h er e a l i s a t i o no fε
through two factors: the change in the marginal product of investment,
α(ε−1), and the change in the internal funds available, V0ε (see expressions
26 and 27). The eﬀect of hedging for the TC model is to set the debt at a
constant level, whereas ￿uctuations of the investment and the internal funds
are maintained to some extent after hedging, according to the value of the
parameter α.
The case of idiosyncratic return on investment, i.e. a return to invest-
ment completely unrelated to movements of the internal funds available (i.e.
α =0 ), is a special case for both the IO and TC models. As already seen
from Figure 1, as well as from the general solutions 12a n d13, the optimal
hedging strategy will be to fully hedge. The impact of the full hedging strat-
egy in case of idiosyncratic return to investment, is to completely eliminate
the randomness of the investment and the debt functions.
Proposition 6 If returns of investment are unrelated to the internal funds
￿uctuations (α =0for both IO and TC), then the full hedging optimal
strategy will fully stabilize both the investment and debt decisions.
The proof follows from substituting for α =0in equations 20, 21, 28,
and 29.
Table 2 shows that when the returns on investment are not related to
internal funds ￿uctuations, the ￿uctuations in the desired investment and
debt levels (￿rst column) would depend only on the internal ￿nance com-
ponent, V0ε, and not on the shocks to the investment function parameters,
(given by α(ε−1) in equations 26 and 27, and by θ in equations 18a n d19).
Hence, the full hedging strategy would ￿x the investment and debt levels
at their expected values, independently from realisation of the hedgeable
shock, ε.
18Table 2 - Idiosyncratic technological change













c−a [￿ − (1 + r)+cV0ε] 1
c−a [￿ − (1 + r)+cV0]
DTC
1
c−a [￿ − (1 + r)+aV0ε] 1
c−a [￿ − (1 + r)+aV0]
6E ﬀects of a productivity shock
To better understand the diﬀerence between the two models introduced in
the previous sections, in this section the Investment Opportunities (IO) and
the Technological Change (TC) mechanisms are compared by observing the
eﬀects of a common shock starting from a common initial equilibrium.
A shock to the parameter b, i.e. a shock to the marginal product of
investment, is exogenous in the IO model and endogenous in the TC model.
In the latter, a technological shock is represented by a shift along both the
investment and debt curves, whereas in the former it is represented by an
upwards shift of the whole curves.
The following ￿gures show the diﬀerences between the two alternative
behaviour. Respectively, they show the eﬀects of the same technological
shock: (i) on the investment functions in case of no hedging (Figure 2); (ii)
on the investment functions in case of hedging (Figure 3); (iii) on the debt
functions in case of no hedging (Figure 4); (iv) on the debt functions in case
of hedging (Figure 5).
The parameters of the investment and cost functions (a, b, k, c, r,a n d
z from equations 14a n d15) are calibrated to respect the following criteria:
(i) the expected value of the product elasticity to the investment is equal
to 0.25, a value typically used in the Cobb-Douglas production function for
the elasticity of the capital; (ii) the expected investment is greater than the
expected internal funds available (I0 >V 0).8 The expected cash ￿ow, V0,i s
8The parameters of the approximated analytical solution are obtained by carrying
on the second order Taylor expansion of Cobb-Douglas functions around the expected
equilibrium (I0,V0,D0, ε =1 ).
19equal to 10; the expected investment, I0, is equal to 20 and, consequently,
the expected debt, D0,i se q u a lt o10. The standard deviation of the shock
to the internal funds is σ =0 .7. The parameter α is set equal to 0.2. The
shock to b is a shift from 2.27 to 2.48, which in the TC model is related to
a shock to the internal funds, ε,f r o m1 to 1.2 (x axis), whereas in the IO
model, ε remains unchanged. The continuous lines are the TC curves, the
dotted lines are the IO ones.
The quantitative eﬀects of the same marginal productivity shock on the
two models￿ investment choices are slightly greater in case of no hedging
(Figure 2) than in case of hedging (Figure 3). In both ￿gures, the IO mech-
anism shows an upwards shift of the curve and a rise of the new optimal
investment, corresponding to an unchanged level of the internal funds, ε =1 ,
whereas the TC mechanism show relatively smaller rise of the optimal in-
vestment, corresponding to a new position on the curve at ε =1 .2.A f t e r
hedging (Figure 3), the investment curves are slightly ￿atter, but the reac-
tions of the investment decisions to the shock do not change in a relevant
way with respect to the non hedging ￿rm.
Figure 2
20Figure 3
T h et w om o d e l sa r em u c hm o r ed i ﬀerent for debt than for investment
behaviour. After the technological shock, the IO mechanism shows a rise
in the debt level, the level of the internal funds being unchanged (ε =1 ),
whereas the TC mechanism shows a reduction of the optimal debt in case




The diﬀerent reactions to the same productivity shock rely on the diﬀerent
behaviour of the internal funds available to the ￿rm. While in the TC model
the internal funds rise along with the extra investment needed, in the IO
22model a rise of the investment productivity is not related to any change in
the internal funds, therefore, the ￿rm needs to raise debt.
The empirical implications of the previous graphs are summarised in
Table 3, which shows the diﬀerent comovements of the variables following a
positive non neutral productivity shock.
Table 3 - Change in marginal productivity of investment
IO=investment opportunities, TC=technological change
ε, b unrelated ε, b positively related
I, D positively related IO
I, D negatively related TC - no hedging
I, D unrelated TC - hedging
The two alternative mechanisms can virtually be distinguished by observ-
ing the behaviour of the same variables after a productivity shock. In the
IO mechanism, where the shock is not linked to any change in the inter-
nal cash ￿ow, investment and debt would be positively related; in the TC
mechanism, where such shock is linked to a change in the internal cash ￿ow,
investment and debt would be either negatively related, in case of no hedg-
ing, or unrelated, in case of hedging, the level of debt being ￿xed in the
latter case.
The described diﬀerent behaviour after a non neutral productivity shock
should make clear that ￿nancing and investment decisions may be strongly
aﬀected by the diﬀerent mechanisms linking internal funds to returns on
investment.
7C o n c l u s i o n
The aim of this work was to show the eﬀects of risk management on the
￿rms￿ investment and debt decisions in two alternative models of hedging.
The models share the same setup, provided by Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein
(1993), where the decision to hedge by using ￿nancial derivatives is taken in
a context where the returns to investment are partially related to the ￿uctu-
ations of the internal ￿nance sources and the external ￿nance is increasingly
23costly. The models are diﬀerent from each other for the mechanism linking
the internal cash ￿ow￿s ￿uctuations to the returns to investment. In the
￿rst model (Investment Opportunity, IO), cash ￿ow and investment returns
are linked through a neutral shock, whereas, in the second one (Technical
Change, TC), through a non neutral shock to the production technology.
Approximated analytical solutions are found for both mechanisms (sec-
tion 3), allowing for a better understanding than the non closed-form so-
lutions about the variables involved in the optimal hedging decisions. In
particular, they show that optimal hedging strategies do not depend on the
level of the variable to be hedged. Some propositions are derived about the
determinants and the properties of the optimal hedging strategies (section
4), and about the eﬀect of hedging on investment and debt decisions (section
5).
The approximated solution of the TC model has been derived under
the simplifying assumption that the shock to the investment function only
aﬀects the marginal product of investment without changing the concavity
of the investment function. Under such assumption, the eﬀect of the optimal
hedging strategy turns out to be to completely ￿x the debt level, therefore,
to completely eliminate the risk of borrowing extra money in case of negative
events, whereas, in the IO model, the optimal hedging strategy does not fully
eliminate debt ￿uctuations. It also turns out that, in the TC model, the
optimal hedging strategy is determined by the correlation between internal
funds and productivity shock, and it is independent from the internal funds
volatility, whereas in the IO model the internal funds volatility is among the
determinants of hedging.
The same non neutral productivity shock has been used to compare the
two models, IO and TC (section 6). The comparison has shown that the
￿rm would react much diﬀerently: in the ￿rst mechanism (IO), where the
shock is not related to any change of the internal funds, investment and
debt would be positively related; in the second one (TC), where such shock
is related to a change of the internal funds, investment and debt would
be either negatively related, in case of no hedging, or unrelated, in case
of hedging, the level of debt being ￿xed in the latter case. Therefore, the
diﬀerent mechanisms linking internal funds and returns to investment imply
24also diﬀerent empirical predictions.
258 Appendix
8.1 Proof of expressions 12 and 13
In this appendix, the optimal hedging general solutions (expressions 12a n d
13) of the two alternative models, IO and TC, are proven. 9
The ￿rst order condition of the time 0 problem (11) for both the IO and















=0 .( 3 1)
In fact, as dV
dh = V0(1 − ε), equation 30 simpli￿es in the following way:
V0E0
£ dπ



















and E0[ε]=1 . Applying a result by and Rubinstein (1976) to the












which simpli￿es to 31.10
T h et w om o d e l sa r ed i ﬀerent in their expressions for dπv
dε . This expression
is given, in the IO model, by
dπv
dε




a n di nt h eT Cm o d e lb y
dπv
dε






Taking the expected value and solving each expression for h give the two
general formulas for the optimal hedging strategy, respectively, 12a n d13.
In this subsection, expressions 32 and 33 are derived.
9Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein (1993) show the general solution for 12, but they do not
show the derivation.
10See Also Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein (1993), note 18p . 1639.
26IO and TC models share the next steps of the proofs. Whatever are the
pro￿t functions, either 7 or 8, the ￿rst derivative of the pro￿tf u n c t i o nw i t h















dV . The second derivative of the pro￿t function with respect


































































































After substituting time 1￿s ￿rst order condition, dπv
































dV , which imply diﬀerent expressions for the
pro￿t function second derivative dπv
dV .
Proof of expression 32:
















The expression for dI
dV is found by applying the implicit function theorem













Substituting into 35, the following expression for the second derivative of

















< 0,( 4 1)
where fII and CDD are evaluated at I = I∗. Expression 41 shows that
the pro￿t function is concave, i.e. the ￿rm improves the expected pro￿tb y
reducing the pro￿t riskiness.
Finally, substituting expressions 38, 39, and dV
dε = V0(1−h),f r o m2 ,i n t o
37, expression 32 is found.
Proof of expression 33:



















The second derivative of the pro￿t function with respect to V evaluated at






























Substituting expressions 42, 43, and dV
dε = V0(1 − h),f r o m2 ,i n t o3 7 ,
expression 33 is found.
288.2 Proof of Proposition 3
The proof is divided in two parts: part a demonstrates the decreasing rela-
tion between hIO and α in the IO model; part b demonstrates a decreasing
linear relation between hTC and α in the TC model.
( a )I ns o l u t i o n2 2f o rhIO, the sign of the hedging strategy as a function
of α is given by the sign of factor multiplying the ratio α
V0 of the RHS in
the equation 22. The expression
¡
(a − c)2 +3 a2α2σ2¢
at the numerator is
always positive as it is a sum of squares. The expression (a − c) at the
denominator is always negative by the de￿nitions of the parameters in 14
and 15. The expression
¡
1+r − cV0 − bc
a
¢
at the numerator is positive for
values of the parameters a, b, r and c consistent the elasticity of the product





0+bI0+k. In fact, taking the
expectations at time 0 of the optimal investment level from the equation
20, the expected level of investment is Ie
0 =
b−(1+r)+cV0
c−a ; the expression
¡
1+r − cV0 − bc
a
¢
is hence positive if Ie
0(c−a)−b<−bc




This upper bound condition to the expected investment is not binding for
values of the parameters consistent with a positive elasticity of the product
to the investment: substituting Ie∗
0 = − b
a into the expression for eI,i t
turns out that eI =0 . Hence, the ratio that multiplies the parameter α is
negative whenever the expression
¡
(a − c)2 +3 acα2σ2¢
at the denominator
is positive, i.e. whenever σ2 < σ∗2 =
−(a−c)2
3α2ac .
( b )I ns o l u t i o n2 5f o rhTC, the optimal hedging strategy depends linearly
on the value of the parameter α. The denominator, V0a,i sn e g a t i v eb yt h e
assumptions of the model (concavity of investment function).
8.3 Proof of Proposition 4
The impact of the hedging possibility on the investment and debt choice can
be measured, respectively, by the diﬀerence between 18 and 20, IIO(ε) −
IIO
h (ε)=hIOcV0(ε−1),a n db yt h ed i ﬀerence between 19a n d2 1, DIO(ε)−
DIO
h (ε)=hIOθaV0(ε−1). The latter impact is grater than the former if the
absolute value of the debt functions diﬀerence is greater than the absolute
value of the investment functions diﬀerence, i.e. |θa| > |c|. By construction,
c>0 and a<0, hence the previous condition becomes |θ| > − c
a.T h i s
29constraint is not binding if c<−a:i tc a nb er e w r i t t e na s|α(ε − 1)| > −c
a−1,
the LHS being always greater or equal to zero, and the RHS being lower than
zero for c<−a.
8.4 Proof of Proposition 5
The sensitivity of investment and debt to the cash ￿ow ￿uctuations, for
the two cases of hedging and no hedging, are given by the functions￿ ￿rst
derivatives. The investment function￿s ￿rst derivatives, dI
dε, are equal to
α + cV0 for the non-hedger (equation 26), to −α
a for the hedger (equation
28). The debt function￿s ￿rst derivative, dD
dε ,a r ee q u a lt oα + aV0 for the
non-hedger (equation 27), to 0 for the hedger (equation 29).
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